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Abstract
The relationship between military spending and economic inequality is not well documented
within the empirical literature, while numerous studies have uncovered the linkages between
military spending and other macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth, unemployment,
purchasing power parity, black market premium, poverty and investment. The purpose of this
article is to examine the causal relationship between military spending and inequality using BVC
and SIPRI data across 58 countries from 1987 to 1999. Panel unit root tests indicate that two
inequality measures (Theil and EHII) under consideration are likely to be non-stationary. The
authors’ work addresses the adverse implications of modeling with non-stationary variables,
since this omission casts serious doubt on the reliability of the relationship between military
spending and inequality. The recent developed panel Granger non-causality tests provide no
evidence to support the causal relationship in either direction between the military spending
and the change in economic inequality. The results are consistently robust to alternative data
sources for military spending, to alternative definitions of the inequality measures, to the log
transformation of the military spending, to the deletion of some data points, and to the division
of OECD and non-OECD countries. Finally, the impulse responses and variance decompositions
based on the panel vector autoregressive regression model are consistent with the findings relied
on Granger non-causality tests.
∗We thank Ron Smith, Jurgen Brauer, Yih-Luan Chyi, Chao-Hsi Huang, Jenn-Hong Tang, Michael Br-
zoska (Associate Editor), and anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this arti-
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http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. We are grateful to the financial support from the National Science Council
of Taiwan in the form of grant NSC-95-2415-H-007-008. Please direct correspondence to Eric Lin at Department of
Economics, National Tsing Hua University, Hsin-chu, Taiwan 30013; slin@mx.nthu.edu.tw.
Introduction
The relationship between military spending and inequality has received marginal attention among
empirical and theoretical academicians, in spite of the surges in military spending in most countries
both during and after the Cold War.1 Due to the lack of a theoretical structure relating military
spending to inequality, and vice versa, a few studies (e.g. Abell, 1994; Ali, 2007) have resorted
to the reduced form regression analysis to uncover correlations and associations among variables,
without relying on a detailed specification from economic theory.
Contrary to previous studies, in this article we adopt the concept of Granger causality (Granger,
1969) to empirically test the causal relationship between military spending and inequality. To the
best of our knowledge, no prior work has been done to look into this causal relationship (in the
Granger sense) using the panel data approach. In this article, we therefore collect the military
spending information from the US Bureau of Verification and Compliance (BVC) and Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data sets, as well as the Theil and EHII indices for
economic and inequality measures from the University of Texas Inequality Project. By matching
all these data sources, we compile a panel data set with 58 countries covering a period of 13 years
from 1987 to 1999.
We attempt to apply the recently developed panel Granger non-causality test (Hurlin, 2004,
2005) to empirically justify the causal relationship between military expenditures and economic
inequality.2 The panel unit root tests indicate that the two inequality measures are likely to be
non-stationary. The causal relationship between the military expenditures and economic inequality
based on first-differenced inequality measures is subsequently analyzed. This study is the first
to address the adverse implications of modeling with non-stationary variables, since this omission
casts serious doubts on the reliability of the relationship between military spending and inequality.
We also check the robustness of the causal relationship by dividing the whole sample of countries
into OECD and non-OECD groups. By controlling for the country heterogeneity using the panel
1One of the essential reasons for empirical studies is the availability of data in regard to the inequality data
(especially for the panel data). For instance, if one goes to the World Development Indicators website at the World
Bank: http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI, one will find that the inequality data (such as Gini coefficients) are
very limited. The limitations of the data could also be seen in Angeles-Castro (2006), who explores the relationship
between economic growth and inequality by employing a balanced panel data set consisting of 31 countries over
1970-1998, even though there are a total of 161 countries in the sample.
2In fact, Hurlin’s approach is not the only way of performing the panel Granger causality test. There are several
alternatives. We will discuss the advantages of Hurlin’s approach over the others in the section of econometric
methods.
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data approach, we hope this study will provide us not only with a clear picture of the relationship
between the military spending and economic inequality, but also with a more accurate inference
than would be provided by the time series or cross sectional data alone. Finally, impulse responses
and variance decompositions based on the vector autoregression model are conducted to learn of
the interrelations among variables without a prior commitment to established theories.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the
literature and then discuss the relationship between military spending and economic inequality in
the following section. The next section introduces the panel unit roots and panel Granger non-
causality tests, which are used as vehicles to test for stationarity and causal relationships in this
paper. The data sources, key variables under investigation, and the empirical results concern the
section that follows. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Numerous studies have uncovered relationships between inequality and economic and political in-
stitutions. Gradstein, Milanovic & Ying (2001) argue that democratization can reduce inequality.
More generally, aﬄuence has been correlated with the presence of democratic institutions (e.g.
Diamond, 1992; Lipset, Seong & Torres, 1993). Rodrik (1999) strongly suggests that democratic
institutions are associated with higher wages; institutions do matter to distributive outcomes. Di-
Nardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) show that de-unionization is an important factor explaining the
rise in wage inequality from 1979 to 1988. Differences in labor market institutions, mainly the
relative decentralization of the wage-setting mechanism, provide a widely accepted explanation of
wage inequality in the US as compared with other OECD countries (Blau & Kahn, 1996).
There is much work which has been done on the relationship between military spending and
other macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth (Chan, 1985; Chowdhury, 1991; Dunne,
Smith & Willenbockel, 2005; Yildirim, Sezgin & Ocal, 2005; Kollias & Makrydakis, 2000), un-
employment (Dunne & Smith, 1990; Abell, 1990, 1992; Barker, Dunne & Smith, 1991; Hooker &
Knetter, 1997; Yildirim & Sezgin, 2003), purchasing power parity (Bahmani-Oskooee & Goswami,
2005), black market premium (Bahmani-Oskooee & Goswami, 2006), poverty (Henderson, 1998),
and investment (Smith, 1977).
As indicated in the previous section, the relationship between military spending and economic
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inequality is not well documented within the empirical literature. In fact, there are only two papers
closely related to our work: Abell (1994) and Ali (2007). As far as we know, Abell (1994) is the first
seminal work to examine the relationship between military spending and the distribution of income.
Abell (1994) uses the time series data for the US during the post-Vietnam War period ranging from
1972 to 1991, and he finds that military spending is associated with increasing income inequality,
after controlling for some macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, taxes, interest rates,
non-military spending and inflation. The result of Abell (1994) relies on the assumption that
military spending is not determined by income inequality.3
In a recent analysis of military spending and inequality with global panel data, Ali (2007)
treats both military spending and inequality as endogenous variables in his model. Ali’s results
indicate that there is a positive effect of military expenditure on pay inequality, and vice versa.
However, Ali incorporates the inequality as the right-hand-side endogenous variable without any
empirical or theoretical justification for the causal direction from inequality to military spending.
With the panel Granger non-causality test, our research aims to employ a global panel data set for
58 countries and to empirically test the relationship for two potentially endogenous variables.
Military Spending and Inequality
There are several ways in which military spending may affect economic inequality. First, from
a Keynesian point of view, defense spending can boost the income in defense-related sectors and
result in increased aggregate demand and employment. Since the level of income inequality increases
during downswings in the economy and decreases during upswings, the implication is that the poor
gain relative to the rich during peaks in the business cycle (Beach, 1977). Then by implication
such spending should provide opportunities for individuals to live equally.
Secondly, increases in military spending could be at the expense of public spending on social
programs such as health and education - which have an equalizing effect. The military as an
institution, therefore, competes for scarce resources with other social entitlements and reduces the
special advantages conferred by those social programs (Ali, 2004). For example, Dre`ze (2000) has
criticized the Indian government’s unwillingness to spend an additional 0.5 percent of GDP to
ensure universal elementary education while it endorsed proposals for larger increases in military
3In Abell (1994), income inequality is a function of military spending but income inequality is not a key factor
affecting military spending.
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spending. However, there may exist a large number of simultaneous channels by which the crowding
out effects and counter effects operate (Deger, 1985), so that the final causality is not clear-cut.4
Third, the aggregate military spending may hide conflicting labor effects among the components
(personnel, procurement, R&D, operations, and maintenance) which result in different impacts on
economic inequality.5 For instance, military personnel spending generally absorbs the less-skilled
labor. In particular, during an economic recession when unemployment increases, more people (the
poor or less-skilled workers) join the armed forces and this increases military personnel spending
while decreasing economic inequality. Military procurement and R&D expenditures are most likely
to give rise to higher economic inequality since they tend to lead to the hiring of more highly skilled
workers.6 In addition, operations and maintenance (O&M) as well as procurement and R&D may
be used as a counter-cyclical mechanism to ensure profits for monopoly capital and employment
for organized labor (Griffin, Devine & Wallace, 1982). If the poor are among the unionized sectors,
procurement, R&D, and O&M will decrease economic inequality. However, it is often the case that
the poor dominate non-unionized sectors that do not benefit from the counter-cyclical spending.
The economic inequality will thus be increased.
Finally, we can establish a causal relationship between the two based on standard microeconomic
theory (Ali, 2007). Assuming that the defense-related sector is already the high-wage sector, if
defense-related labor inputs are specialized and in inelastic supply, an increase in the demand for
defense will increase the inter-sector dispersion in wages, at least over short or intermediate periods
of time. In the developed countries in particular, for example, an increase in the demand for
military personnel tends to drive up military pay because the supply of personnel to the military
is inelastic. Likewise, higher outlays on procurement tend to drive up the wages of electrical
engineers, aircraft and shipbuilding workers, and other specialized labor inputs related to defense
production. The inequality measure is likely to increase as a result. The long-run inter-sector
adjustments in labor supply might temper this effect on measured inter-sector wage inequality.
To turn this around, if workers in the defense-related sector enjoy higher wages to begin with, a
reduction in defense spending should lower their relative wages and reduce inequality. In general, the
more the equipment-intensive military expenditure is, the more we expect the inequality-increasing
4The empirical findings in regard to the defense-welfare trade-off are classified into negative, positive or no trade-
offs. For more details, refer to Yildirim & Sezgin (2002).
5Henderson (1998) analyzes the impact of the segregation of military spending on the issue of poverty.
6Abell (1994) provides empirical evidence for the US to support this point.
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effects to dominate; the more labor-intensive the military is and the more home grown the military
production, the more we might expect to find inequality-reduction effects in the data.
On the other hand, the relationship running from economic inequality to military spending
is rarely discussed in the literature. However, from the standpoint of political economy, if the
economic inequality is enlarged, this will destabilize the society and will be a source of social
tension, thus fueling demands for social and political change (Ali, 2004). Therefore, an increase
in military spending is the response of those in power to maintain social order. Suppressing the
trade unions and other egalitarian social forces increases inequality and further fuels the need to
increase military spending. In its quest for stability, the establishment expresses its preferences
for preserving peace and the status quo by suppressing the dissident and consequently increasing
inequality. Therefore, the level of inequality has an impact on the demand for military spending;
as inequality increases, military spending might rise.
Recently, Caverley (2007) has attempted to link economic inequality with military capitalization
through a micro-foundational argument that the median voter possesses the ability to reduce her
costs of war. He sets up a neoclassical production function for defense to predict capital intensive
defense preparation in democracies based on median voter preferences. One of the results suggests
that military capitalization will increase as the inequality in the distribution of wealth rises.
From the above discussion, we know that the link between military spending and inequality is
quite complex in that there are many variables that affect military spending and inequality through
many channels, especially in the direction running from the former to the latter. Due to the lack of
a formal testable model in the literature, it is difficult to empirically establish the interdependency
between the two variables using a fully specified multivariate model. Furthermore, it could be the
case that the relationship is specific to some regions (say, Western Europe and the US) such that
we may not detect this link empirically.7 Nevertheless, it is possible to have two opposite driving
forces running from military spending to economic inequality that offset each other so that we are
unable to detect the association in empirical studies.
7In our preliminary analysis, military spending and inequality in different regions of the world have been observed
to exhibit different and unique patterns. We will leave a thorough investigation of this link based on regional analysis
to future research.
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Econometric Methods
From our previous theoretical arguments, the causal relationship between military spending and
economic inequality could be in either or both directions. It is also possible to even have no inter-
dependency. Abell (1994) utilizes US time series data with a single regression (inequality is treated
exogenously), and Ali (2007) uses a global panel data with a simultaneous regression (inequality is
ad hoc treated endogenously) to examine the relationship between military spending and economic
inequality. In this article, we rely on the concept of Granger causality to empirically test the causal
relationship between military spending and inequality without assuming the exogeneity or endo-
geneity of the underlying variables a priori. The military spending ‘causes’ economic inequality in
the Granger sense if the lagged military spending helps forecast economic inequality. Even though
the Granger causality test for time series data has been well developed, a better way of testing for
causality is to combine both the cross sectional and time series data, and to perform the so-called
panel Granger non-causality test (Hurlin & Venet, 2001; Hurlin, 2004, 2005). Consequently, the
panel Granger non-causality test is more efficient than when only the time series data are used
(Hurlin & Venet, 2001). Other advantages for using panel data include: 1) the ability to control
for individual heterogeneity; 2) the increased precision of the regression estimates (using a large
sample size relative to the cross sectional data); 3) a reduction in identification problems (identify-
ing individual dynamics); and 4) the ability to model temporal effects without aggregation bias as
in time series studies.8
To test the relationship between two variables in the Granger sense, consider the following linear
panel data model:
yit = αi +
K∑
k=1
γ(k)yit−k +
K∑
k=1
β(k)xit−k + εit,
where αi captures the individual specific effect across i and the coefficients γ(k) and β(k) are implic-
itly assumed to be constant for all i. The pioneering work on the panel Granger causality test by
Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen (1988) involves testing the null hypothesis that β(1) = ... = β(K) = 0
against the causality from x to y for all the cross-sectional units. However, this approach may
result in several problems. First, to implement the panel Granger causality test, we need to obtain
8For the theoretical arguments made in the previous section, we basically look at links between in-country in-
equality and military spending. It is worth noting that with use of the panel approach in this article, we open up
the possibility of other theoretical linkages between between-country inequality and military spending. We owe this
remark to the Associate Editor.
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the estimators for γ(k) and β(k). It is well-known that the fixed effect estimator is biased and in-
consistent in the dynamic panel data model when there are a large number of cross-sectional units
observed over relatively short time periods (Nickell, 1981). Secondly, for short time panels, the
Wald-type statistic with respect to the null hypothesis is not a standard distribution (Hurlin &
Venet, 2001). Finally, the panel Granger causality test proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen
(1988) imposes the homogeneous alternative, which is a very strong hypothesis (Granger, 2003).
To overcome the above-mentioned disadvantages, Hurlin (2004) proposes testing the homogeneous
non-causality (HNC) null hypothesis against the heterogeneous non-causality hypothesis (HENC).
HENC allows some but not all of the individuals to Granger cause from x to y. The linear panel
data model under consideration is given by:
yit = αi +
K∑
k=1
γ
(k)
i yit−k +
K∑
k=1
β
(k)
i xit−k + εit,
where γ(k)i and β
(k)
i are various coefficients of yit−k and xit−k for individual i, respectively. The
idea behind Hurlin (2004) is to average the individual Wald statistics associated with the standard
Granger HNC tests for units i = 1, ..., N. Hurlin (2005) also suggests a similar test statistic to deal
with the unbalanced panel data set. In this paper, we apply the methods of Hurlin (2004, 2005) to
conduct the panel Granger non-causality test.
The new procedure by Hurlin (2004, 2005) also follows a standard Granger causality where the
variables that enter into the system need to be covariance-stationary. This could be accomplished
by implementing the unit root test. In principle we can pool the data and conduct the traditional
unit root tests such as the Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and KPSS
tests. However, the little power of the individual unit root test makes it difficult to detect the
stationarity of the series. Pooling the individuals across time is one way to come up with a more
powerful unit root test, which has been pioneered by Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002).9 In addition,
there are several types of panel unit root tests, for instance, see Im, Pesaran & Shin (LPS, 2003),
Breitung (2000), Maddala & Wu (MW, 1999), Choi (2001), Hadri (2000).
9The original paper by Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) comes from the highly cited working paper by Levin & Lin (1992)
in the literature.
– 8 –
Empirical Results
Data and Variables Description
Since the defense data are often considered to be unreliable, we try to use military spending data
obtained from two different data sources. The first source is the US’s BVC military spending,
which has reported the world military expenditures for a decade. Another popular data source
for military expenditures is SIPRI, which is an independent international institute for research
into problems of peace and conflict. Both sets of military spending are in constant US dollars.
The military expenditures are extended to cover a period of 13 years from 1987 to 1999 for 140
countries. Along the same lines as Ali (2007), we choose the per capita military expenditure and
the logarithm of per capita military expenditure variables to test the causal relationships with the
inequality measures.
As for the economic inequality measures, we focus on the Theil and EHII indices, both of which
are available from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). The larger the two indices,
the larger the levels of inequality. The Theil index is proposed by Theil (1979) and inherits several
nice properties such as easy computation and decomposition into between-group and within-group
components. For more details on this see Galbraith (1998), Galbraith & Kum (2004), Galbraith
& Conceic¸a˜o (2001). Note that the Theil index in the UTIP data set is actually the industrial pay
inequality, which measures the wage dispersion across industries in the manufacturing sector so
that it is a component of overall economic inequality. The EHII index available in the UTIP is the
Estimated Household Income Inequality, which combines the industrial pay inequality data and the
Deininger & Squire (1996) Gini coefficient. On this see Galbraith & Kum (2004). The latest Theil
and EHII inequality measures in the UTIP contain 156 countries covering the period 1963-99.10
The original data contain up to 140 countries covering 13 years and 156 countries covering 37
years obtained from the military spending and inequality data sources, respectively. Hurlin’s (2004,
2005) panel Granger non-causality test is based on averaging the standard time series Granger non-
causality test for all countries. This means that for a given country both the military and inequality
information should be available and meet the requirement of lasting at least eight consecutive
years for that country. The countries with insufficient military data (e.g. Iceland and Iraq) and
inequality data (e.g. France, Sudan, Brazil and Argentina) are therefore excluded from this study.
10The EHII and UTIP-UNIDO (Theil index) data sets are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html.
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Most of these countries are excluded due to the lack of sufficient inequality measures. We also
consider the countries with both BVC and SIPRI military spending to see if the sources of the
military data matter. Thus, to compromise those various data sets, we match them to generate our
(unbalanced) panel of 58 countries covering a period of 13 years. The number of countries decreases
slightly to 52 if we stick to the balanced panel. The countries in the data are presented in Table
1. The descriptive statistics of the underlying variables are listed in Appendix Table I in levels.
The sample correlation coefficient between the BVC and SIPRI military expenditures is about
0.910 indicating that the linear relationship between these two military expenditures is strong and
positive. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between the pair of inequality measures is found to
be 0.753. This is conceptually intuitive since the former pair measures the same variable (military
spending), but the latter pair uses different inequality definitions to approximate inequality.
[Table 1 is about here!]
Panel Unit Root Tests
The results in Table 2 show that all the military spending variables {BVC, ln(BVC), SIPRI, and
ln(SIPRI)} pass four versions of the panel unit root tests, i.e., the four variables are stationary
regardless of the military data sources or logarithmic transformations used. However, the LLC, IPS,
and MW tests strongly show that the inequality variables (Theil and EHII) are non-stationary.11
The non-stationarity in levels of the inequality measure is also found in Assane & Grammy (2003)
and Nath & Mamun (2004).12 We then adjust the inequality variables by taking the first differences.
The last two rows in Table 2 show that the first-difference transformation will remove the potential
non-stationarity. Note that Ali (2007) simply uses the Theil index in levels for the simultaneous
determination of the link between military expenditure and economic inequality. In what follows, we
will consider two scenarios to implement the panel Granger non-causality test. One is to ignore the
possible non-stationarity of the inequality variables and the other is to utilize the first-differenced
version of the inequality measures.
[Table 2 is about here!]
11We also find that the logarithms of the two inequality indices cannot reject the null unit root hypothesis. Further-
more, if we take the whole sample of Theil and EHII measures in the UTIP covering 156 countries from 1963-1999,
non-stationarity is still found for the two measures.
12Assane & Grammy (2003) use U.S. annual data (1960-96) to determine the causal relationship between the growth
and inequality. Nath & Mamun (2004) show that the EHII in levels are non-stationary in Bangladesh for the period
from 1967 to 1992.
– 10 –
Panel Granger Non-causality Tests
To conduct the panel Granger non-causality test by Hurlin (2004, 2005), we note that the require-
ment, Ti > 5 + 2K (Ti : time spans for country i) should be met. Since the maximum of Ti is 13
in our sample period, the possible choice of the autoregressive lag orders (K) remains 1, 2, and 3,
e.g. if K = 2, one would need at least 10 consecutive observations (Ti = 10) for country i. Since
we have relatively short panels, we are likely to run out of degrees of freedom. In what follows, the
empirical results are based on the more reliable case of K = 1.13 To exhaust all possibilities, we
consider testing the Granger non-causality running from the military spending set {BVC, SIPRI,
ln(BVC), ln(SIPRI)} to the inequality pair {Theil, EHII}, and vice versa. Both the balanced and
unbalanced panels are taken into consideration. This enables us to implement 32 combinations of
the panel Granger non-causality tests.
We temporarily ignore the possible non-stationarity and run the panel Granger non-causality
tests. Table 3 indicates that the causal relationships between two versions of the per capita military
spending (and its logarithm) and the inequality measures are significantly bi-directional. Since the
results are obtained by ignoring the potential non-stationarity of the inequality measures, we will
not provide a further discussion.
[Table 3 is about here!]
We now take potential non-stationarity into account by first-differencing Theil and EHII. Table
4 indicates that changes in the inequality measures (i.e. ∆Theil and ∆EHII) do not Granger
cause the military spending, and vice versa. In general, this finding holds for either balanced or
unbalanced panels.14 The exception is that there is a weak causality running from SIPRI to the
change in EHII, and from ∆EHII to BVC. With that exception in mind, we find no evidence to
support the causal relationship between military spending and changes in inequality measures. This
implies that if we neglect the possibility of non-stationarity in the inequality variables, it is very
likely that the true causal relationship will be distorted.
[Table 4 is about here!]
13The simulation in Hurlin (2004, 2005) shows that the size and power are reasonably good with small T . However,
we occasionally face a shortage of countries (say, N = 4) if the inequality variables are first-differenced.
14To save space, the results for unbalanced panels are available upon request.
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To check the robustness of the insignificant causal relationship between military spending and
changes in economic inequality, we separate the countries into OECD and non-OECD countries.
15Another reason for this exercise is that the causal relationship between the variables under consid-
eration could be sensitive to the rich and poor countries. For details see Choe (2003); Hoffmann et
al. (2005); Yildirim, Sezgin & Ocal (2005). There are 17 OECD and 35 non-OECD countries after
the countries are divided up.16 Table 4 again shows that in general there is no Granger causality
between the two variables in the cases of both the OECD and non-OECD countries.17 This is
consistent with what we found for all countries as a whole. It is worth noting that no causality in
either direction is perceived between military expenditure and ∆Theil, regardless of how countries
are classified. Meanwhile, we also observe that ∆EHII occasionally exhibits a significance in terms
of the Granger causality both in the BVC and SIPRI military expenditures.
Recently, in using data on US military expenditure, Brauer (2007) has found that even adding
to or deleting one year from the data may drastically change the estimated coefficients. Thus, it is
worth implementing a further robustness check. We conduct the experiment by considering three
alternative time periods: 1987-97, 1987-98, and 1987-99. Note that time intervals 1987-97 and
1987-98 represent deleting two years and one year in terms of data points for each country from the
original data period (1987-1999), respectively.18 Most of the Granger non-causality test statistics
are insignificant and provide no evidence of a uni-directional or bi-directional relationship between
military expenditures and changes in economic inequality. For instance, the three test statistics for
testing the null that BVC does not Granger cause ∆Theil are -0.825 (87-97), -0.946 (87-98), and
-0.906 (87-99).19 This result is consistent with our previous finding.
Since one cannot determine whether there exists a specific relationship between these two vari-
ables, we thus apply the concept of Granger causality to investigate this relationship. Consequently,
our results of no significant statistical relationship between military spending and changes in eco-
15We thank Ron Smith for pointing out that ‘there could be Granger causality in all countries in the sample from
military expenditure to inequality but in half of the countries the effect is positive and half negative, so the global
effect is zero’.
16The 17 OECD countries in our sample include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, and the United States.
17The results for using the levels in the EHII and Theil indices are listed in Table 3, which has a very similar
conclusion to the sample as a whole. Again, we cannot interpret the results here since the inequality variables in
levels are non-stationary.
18Of course, we may want to see what happens to the Granger non-causality test if we add more recent data points
(say, 1987-2000, 1987-2001). However, the EHII and Theil inequality data are reported by UTIP up to the year 1999.
We therefore turn to the ‘in-sample’ instead of the ‘out-of-sample’ comparison.
19To save space, the results of the sensitivity analysis are available upon request.
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nomic inequality depart from those in past studies such as Abell (1994) and Ali (2007). This
may result from employing the approach of Granger causality and dealing with the possible non-
stationarity of inequality measures, as well as expanding a panel data set with more observations.
First-differencing the inequality variables is crucial for our findings. A significant relationship be-
tween military spending and economic inequality is consistent with previous studies if we neglect
non-stationary inequality measures. Moreover, our insignificant results may simply reflect the fact
that the two opposite forces in terms of the expansion of military expenditures on changes in
inequality have just offset each other.
Impulse Response Analysis
In order to understand the reaction of the military spending or change in inequality to the innova-
tions in another variable in the system, we set up a panel vector autoregression (VAR) model and
perform an impulse response analysis. To draw a comparison with the Granger non-causality test,
we adopt the panel VAR(1) model in standard form, which is given by:
Zit = Ao +A1Zi,t−1 + eit,
where Zit is the vector of any combination of military spending and change in inequality pairs,
Ao and A1 are coefficient vectors, and the eit are composite error terms. For instance, we can
take Zit = (BVCit, ∆Theilit)′. The impulse response functions are plotted in Appendix Figure 1.20
The figure shows that the response of military spending to the change in inequality (∆Theilit)
shocks causes military spending to jump at the beginning and to die out quickly to the long-run
value after 6 time periods. For instance, the response of changes in the Theil index to a one-unit
increase of innovation in SIPRI per capita military spending increases first, declines in period 2, and
increases again. On the other hand, the response of the change in inequality to shocks in military
spending decreases and subsequently increases to the long-run equilibrium. Various combinations
of the impulse responses in Appendix Figure 1 indicate that the patterns are invariant to the data
sources of the military spending and economic inequality indices.21 In general, the perturbation
of innovations in military spending and in first-differenced inequality measures seems to have no
statistically significant effects on the other variables. This result is comparable to that obtained
20We thank Insessa Love for providing the Stata code to estimate the panel VAR models.
21We also try the VAR(2) setting and yield quite similar results to the case of VAR(1). It is well known that the
ordering of the variables is crucial in impulse response analysis. Our experiment shows that reversing the Cholesky
decomposition does not have a significant impact on the impulse responses.
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using the panel Granger non-causality approach. Moreover, the variance decomposition in Table 5
summarizes the percentage of variation in military spending explained by the change in inequality
and vice versa. It is clear that a tiny proportion (below 10%) of the movements in a variable is
due to the shocks of the other variable. However, in most of the cases, the variations due to the
variable’s own shocks are over 90%. This finding is again parallel to the fact that there is no causal
relationship between military spending and the change in inequality according to the panel Granger
non-causality test.
[Table 5 is about here!]
Conclusion
In this paper we contribute to the literature by examining the presence and direction of Granger
causality between military spending and economic inequality for a larger data set of countries
using more refined econometric techniques. This task is performed by considering both the BVC
and SIPRI military spending data as well as the UTIP’s Theil and EHII inequality measures across
58 countries from 1987 to 1999. Panel unit root tests indicate that the Theil and EHII inequality
measures are likely to be non-stationary. The panel Granger non-causality tests (Hurlin, 2004, 2005)
show that in general there is no Granger causality in either direction between military spending
and changes in economic inequality. Our study is the first to address the adverse implications of
modeling with non-stationary variables, since this omission casts serious doubt on the reliability
of the relationship between military spending and inequality. We also perform an experiment
by taking a logarithm of the military spending but this does not alter the results of the analysis.
However, if we ignore the non-stationarity of the variables, the causal relationship runs significantly
in both directions. This fact emphasizes that non-stationary income inequality measures should be
borne in mind by researchers when they try to test the two variables empirically.
Furthermore, grouping data into OECD and non-OECD countries basically does not change our
results, i.e., there is also no evidence of Granger causality in either direction within OECD and/or
non-OECD countries. In addition, sensitivity analysis shows that our results are robust in that
deleting one or two data points does not affect the outcome. Finally, the impulse response analysis
and variance decompositions are conducted and the results are consistent with our previous findings
in that the proportion of the movements in a variable being due to shocks in the other variable is
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very small.
Abell (1994) using US time series data, and Ali (2007) using panel data, show that military
spending is indeed positively associated with income inequality. However, they both treat the
inequality measures as stationary. It would be interesting for future work to re-examine the rela-
tionship in a regression model if the income inequality measures were to be treated as non-stationary
variables. Another direction for future research would be to develop a testable economic theory
which might first endogenize military spending and inequality and then examine the linkage between
the two key variables empirically.
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Table 1: Countries in the Data
Algeria Australia Austria Barbados* Bolivia Bulgaria
Cameron Canada Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cyprus*
Denmark Ecuador Egypt Ethiopia Finland Greece
Honduras* Hungary India Indonesia Ireland Israel
Italy Japan Jordan Luxembourg* Kenya Korea
Kuwait Malawi Malaysia Malta Mauritius Mexico
Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Panama Philippines
Poland Senegal Singapore South Africa Spain Sri Lanka*
Swaziland Sweden Syria Taiwan Turkey UK
USA Uruguay Venezuela* Zimbabwe
The countries with asterisks are excluded for the balanced panel data.
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Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests for Key Variables
Variables LLC IPS MW Choi
Bpme -15.314 -5.264 172.361 213.844
(0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000)
Lbpme -6.573 -2.501 141.984 181.201
(0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.000)
Spme -11.028 -5.235 206.613 267.444
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lspme -26.439 -9.821 194.811 246.912
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Theil 5.164 3.183 119.680 142.437
(1.000) (0.999) (0.140) (0.007)
EHII -0.267 1.570 121.512 145.202
(0.395) (0.942) (0.116) (0.005)
∆Theil -9.864 -9.527 318.334 429.094
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆EHII -14.486 -10.313 310.872 433.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bpme, Lbpme, Spme, Lspme, Theil, EHII, ∆Theil, and ∆EHII denote the BVC per capita mili-
tary expenditure, the logarithm of Bpme, SIPRI per capita military expenditure, the logarithm
of Spme, the Theil index, the EHII index, the first differenced Theil, and the first differenced
EHII, respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Panel Granger Causality Tests – Military Spending vs. Inequality
(A) Military spending to Inequality
Bpme 9 Theil Lbpme 9 Theil Spme 9 Theil Lspme 9 Theil
Total countries 4.409∗∗∗ 4.009∗∗∗ 2.670∗∗∗ 3.299∗∗∗
OECD countries 3.675∗∗∗ 3.940∗∗∗ 4.273∗∗∗ 4.896∗∗∗
Non-OECD countries 3.030∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗ 0.734 1.113
Bpme 9 EHII Lbpme 9 EHII Spme 9 EHII Lspme 9 EHII
Total countries 3.235∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗ 1.756∗ 1.678∗
OECD countries 1.700∗ 1.976∗∗ 1.704∗ 2.369∗∗
Non-OECD countries 2.758∗∗∗ 2.393∗∗ 1.077 0.632
(B) Inequality to Military spending
Theil 9 Bpme Theil 9 Lbpme Theil 9 Spme Theil 9 Lspme
Total countries 5.621∗∗∗ 5.388∗∗∗ 3.188∗∗∗ 3.003∗∗∗
OECD countries 5.736∗∗∗ 5.378∗∗∗ 1.769∗ 1.617
Non-OECD countries 3.298∗∗∗ 3.211∗∗∗ 2.668∗∗∗ 2.540∗∗
EHII 9 Bpme EHII 9 Lbpme EHII 9 Spme EHII 9 Lspme
Total countries 5.373∗∗∗ 4.146∗∗∗ 4.233∗∗∗ 3.869∗∗∗
OECD countries 4.719∗∗∗ 4.463∗∗∗ 2.189∗∗ 1.997∗∗
Non-OECD countries 3.562∗∗∗ 2.294∗∗ 3.630∗∗∗ 3.319∗∗∗
“9” is the panel Granger homogeneous non-causality (HNC) null hypothesis.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Panel Granger Causality Tests – Military Spending vs. Inequality with Correcting for
Possible Non-stationarity
(A) Military Spending to Change in Inequality
Bpme 9 ∆Theil Lbpme 9 ∆Theil Spme 9 ∆Theil Lspme 9 ∆Theil
Total countries -0.906 -0.787 0.516 0.685
OECD countries -0.761 -0.697 -0.379 -0.309
Non-OECD countries -0.591 -0.499 0.850 1.005
Bpme 9 ∆EHII Lbpme 9 ∆EHII Spme 9 ∆EHII Lspme 9 ∆EHII
Total countries 0.406 0.505 1.737∗ 1.846∗
OECD countries -0.722 -0.688 -0.623 -0.592
Non-OECD countries 0.937 1.041 2.449∗∗ 2.559∗∗
(B) Change in Inequality to Military spending
∆Theil 9 Bpme ∆Theil 9 Lbpme ∆Theil 9 Spme ∆Theil 9 Lspme
Total countries 0.923 -0.547 -0.210 -0.320
OECD countries -0.376 -0.443 0.639 0.678
Non-OECD countries 1.330 -0.366 -0.652 -0.808
∆EHII 9 Bpme ∆EHII 9 Lbpme ∆EHII 9 Spme ∆EHII 9 Lspme
Total countries 2.136∗∗ 0.245 0.389 0.241
OECD countries 1.949∗ 1.660∗ 2.075∗∗ 2.095∗∗
Non-OECD countries 1.294 -0.772 -0.853 -1.039
“9” is the panel Granger homogeneous non-causality (HNC) null hypothesis.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Variance Decompositions
Periods Bpme ∆Theil Periods Bpme ∆EHII
Bpme 10 0.747 0.253 Bpme 10 0.949 0.051
∆Theil 10 0.188 0.812 ∆EHII 10 0.018 0.982
Bpme 20 0.747 0.253 Bpme 20 0.949 0.051
∆Theil 20 0.188 0.812 ∆EHII 20 0.019 0.981
Periods Spme ∆Theil Periods Spme ∆EHII
Spme 10 0.948 0.052 Spme 10 0.987 0.013
∆Theil 10 0.281 0.719 ∆EHII 10 0.028 0.972
Spme 20 0.948 0.052 Spme 20 0.987 0.013
∆Theil 20 0.281 0.719 ∆EHII 20 0.029 0.971
The numbers denote the percentage of variation in the row variable explained by the column
variable.
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